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1. Theoretical framework  
 
In developing a theory of knowledge, a fundamental decision must be made 
about the nature of representation: Should representations be modal or amodal? 
We address this important distinction briefly and then summarize several lines 
of research that bear on it empirically. 
 
 
1.1. Amodal symbol systems 
 
Across the cognitive sciences, standard theories of knowledge typically 
adopt the assumptions of what we call amodal symbol systems. According to 
this view, information in the physical world produces neural states in perceptual 
systems. A transduction process takes these states as input and produces 
descriptions of them in a completely new representation language. On 
perceiving a chair, for example, descriptions are transduced that bear no 
commonalities with their perceptual origins. This lack of commonality exists 
because the symbols that constitute descriptions are amodal and arbitrary. 
These symbols are amodal because their structure is unrelated to the structure 
of perceptual states. These symbols are arbitrary, because they are linked to 
perceptual states via arbitrary conventions of association. Analogous to how 
words typically bear arbitrary relations to entities in the world, amodal symbols 
bear arbitrary relations to the perceptual states that produce them. Just as the 
phonological structure of a word usually provides no guidance about reference, 
neither does the structure of an amodal symbol.  As a further consequence, the 
similarity between amodal symbols bears no relation to the similarity between 
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perceptual states (e.g., symbols for blue and green are not necessarily more 
similar than symbols for blue and red). 
As amodal symbols become transduced from perceptual states, they enter 
into larger representational structures, including feature lists, frames, schemata, 
semantic networks, and logical expressions. In turn, these structures support all 
of the higher cognitive functions, including knowledge, memory, language, and 
thought. For reviews of such theories, see Smith and Medin (1981), Rumelhart 
and Norman (1988), Barsalou (1992), and Barsalou and Hale (1993). For 
explicit statements about the importance of symbols being amodal and 
arbitrary, see Newell and Simon (1972), Fodor (1975), Pylyshyn (1984), 
Haugeland (1985), and Harnad (1990). 
 
 
1.2. Perceptual symbol systems 
 
A very different approach to knowledge takes the form of what we call 
perceptual symbol systems. According to this view, perceptual states are not 
transduced into a completely new representational language. Instead, subsets of 
perceptual states are extracted to function symbolically and support the higher 
cognitive functions. On perceiving a chair, information is extracted from 
perceptual representations and transferred to memory. Once in memory, these 
extractions function symbolically, standing for referents in the world and 
entering into all forms of symbolic computation. Most importantly, these 
symbols are modal and analogical, not amodal and arbitrary. These symbols are 
modal because they have the same structure as perceptual states. These symbols 
are analogical, first, because their structure is informative about reference 
(although neither necessary nor sufficient; Goodman, 1976), and, second, 
because similarity between them corresponds to similarity between perceptual 
states (assuming a constrained metric of similarity, Goodman, 1955). 
This type of theory has been around a long time, at least since Aristotle (4th 
century BC/1961), and certainly since Locke (1690/1959), Berkeley 
(1710/1982), Hume (1739/1978), Kant (1787/1965), Reid, (1764/1970, 
1785/1969), and, more recently, Russell (1919/1956) and Price (1953). Indeed, 
until the early twentieth century, nearly all theorists concerned with the mind 
assumed that knowledge had a strong perceptual character to it. In the modern 
era, however, most researchers have embraced amodal symbol systems in one 
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form or another. The exceptions have mostly been cognitive linguists, who 
have made the perceptual character of knowledge a central assumption (e.g., 
Fauconnier, 1985; Jackendoff, 1987; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987, 1988; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Langacker, 1986, 1987, 1991, Sweetser, 1990; Talmy, 
1983, 1988). Outside of linguistics, other cognitive scientists have rediscovered 
this approach as well. In psychology, these researchers include Mandler (1992), 
Tomasello (1992), Gibbs (1994), Glenberg (in press), and ourselves (Barsalou, 
1993; Barsalou & Prinz, in press; Barsalou, Yeh, Luka, Olseth, Mix, & Wu, 
1993; Prinz & Barsalou, in press). In philosophy, these researchers include 
Barwise and Etchemendy (1990, 1991), Thagard (1992), and Peacocke (1992). 
In artificial intelligence, see Glasgow (1993). Many additional researchers have 
considered the role of perceptual simulation in mental imagery, but we focus on 
its role in knowledge here. 
Our work develops perceptual symbol systems in two ways: First, we have 
constructed a theory of perceptual symbols that supports the standard symbolic 
functions. Second, we have established an empirical case for this theory. In 
other papers, we present the theory in greater detail (Barsalou, 1993, 1996; 
Barsalou & Prinz, in press; Barsalou et al., 1993; Prinz & Barsalou, in press). 
Although we focus on our empirical work here, we frame it with a brief 
summary of the theory's seven core assumptions (see Barsalou, 1996, and 
Barsalou and Prinz, in press, for more complete presentations). 
(1) Perceptual symbols are brain states in perceptual systems. We assume 
that brain states in perceptual systems—not conscious subjective images—
constitute perceptual symbols. Although conscious images may accompany the 
processing of perceptual symbols, much evidence indicates that images are not 
necessary and that the processing of perceptual symbols often occurs 
unconsciously. Defining perceptual symbols this way also avoids various 
problems associated with conscious images, and it provides powerful new tools 
for representing knowledge perceptually. 
(2) Perceptual symbols are schematic. Similar to cognitive linguists (e.g., 
Langacker, 1986; Talmy, 1983), we assume that perceptual symbols are 
schematic, containing only small fragments of perceptual states. The basic 
cognitive mechanism of selective attention extracts a very small subset of the 
information in a perceptual state and transfers it to long-term memory for later 
use as a symbol. The resulting symbol is schematic, containing only the 
extracted information (e.g., the shape of an entity, filtering out its color, 
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position, etc.). 
(3) Perceptual symbols are multimodal. Perceptual symbols do not just 
represent vision, space, or the sensory modalities. Instead, they can represent 
any aspect of experience, including all five sensory modalities, proprioception, 
and introspection. Perceptual symbols extracted from introspection are 
particularly important (e.g. cognitive states, operations, and affects), because 
they play central roles in our accounts of abstract concepts. In general, we 
assume that the schematization process just described extracts perceptual 
memories from all aspects of experience and stores them for later use as 
symbols. 
(4) Perceptual symbols enter into simulation competence. Perceptual 
symbols do not reside independently of one another in memory. Instead, they 
become integrated into systems that allow the cognitive system to simulate 
entities and events in their absence. On this view, having an adequate concept 
of something is having an acceptable degree of competence in simulating it. We 
do not assume that these simulations are ever complete, nor that they are 
completely veridical or unbiased. Furthermore, a simulation competence is not 
simply a collection of "sense data." Instead, innate knowledge about space, 
time, events, objects, and properties structures the perceptual symbols in a 
simulation competence. 
(5) Perceptual symbols are productive. Similar to cognitive linguists (e.g., 
Langacker, 1986), we assume that a finite number of perceptual symbols can be 
used to construct an infinite number of complex symbols using combinatoric 
and recursive mechanisms. Productivity is essentially the inverse process of 
symbol formation: Whereas information is filtered out of perceptual 
representations to form schematic perceptual symbols, information is added 
back to these schematic representations to implement productivity. Because the 
information added back can go beyond the information filtered, productivity 
enables the construction of representations for entities and events never 
experienced. 
(6) Perceptual symbols represent propositions. Using the productive system 
of perceptual symbols developed thus far, it is possible to represent 
propositions that describe and interpret situations. When attempting to map 
simulation competencies into a perceived or imagined situation, type-token 
relations result that can construe a situation in an infinite number of ways that 
are true or false. This perceptually-based approach implements the basic 
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functions of propositions in a psychological context. 
(7) Perceptual symbols represent abstract concepts directly. Unlike some 
cognitive linguists, we do not believe that metaphor constitutes the primary 
representation of abstract concepts such as truth, negation, disjunction, and 
anger. Instead, we believe that most abstract concepts are understood directly 
in terms of the relevant perceptual experience. Metaphor, when it applies, 
guides, embellishes, and construes this experience. In our attempts to represent 
abstract concepts directly, we have found that three mechanisms are central (1) 
event simulations that frame focal concepts (e.g., Fillmore, 1985; Langacker, 
1986), (2) perceptual symbols from introspection, (3) propositional construal. 
Our conjecture is that any abstract concept can be represented directly using 
these three mechanisms. 
 
 
2. Empirical Research 
 
The primary goal of our empirical work has been to test the assumption that 
perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing. Whereas standard views 
assume that people process concepts using amodal symbol systems such as 
feature lists, frames, and semantic networks, we explore the possibility that 
people process concepts by simulating their referents perceptually. Although 
these simulations may at times be conscious, they may often proceed 
unconsciously (1.2). Note that our empirical efforts thus far do not constitute a 
full test of our theory. Indeed, most aspects of the theory remain untested. 
Instead, our research has only explored the theory's core assumption, namely, 
that perceptual simulation lies at the heart of conceptual processing. 
To explore this issue, we have subjects perform standard conceptual tasks, 
such as feature listing and property verification. In the critical conditions, 
subjects do not see pictorial stimuli, nor are they asked to perform perceptual 
processing, such as imagery. Instead, subjects only receive linguistic stimuli 
and are asked in as neutral a manner as possible to perform conceptual 
processing. Of interest is whether subjects perform perceptual simulation 
spontaneously. 
 
 
2.1. Instructional equivalence and perceptual work 
Barsalou, Solomon, and Wu 6 
 
Across several lines of experimentation, we have sought two general forms 
of evidence for perceptual simulation: instructional equivalence and perceptual 
work. To examine instructional equivalence, each experiment includes neutral 
and imagery subjects. As just described, neutral subjects receive standard task 
instructions with nothing said about images. For feature listing, subjects are 
asked to list the properties typically true of a concept. For property verification, 
subjects are asked to verify whether a concept has a property. In contrast, 
imagery subjects are asked to perform these conceptual tasks using images. For 
feature listing, subjects are asked to construct images for the referents of 
concepts and then describe these images. For property verification, subjects are 
asked to construct an image of a concept and then verify the truth or falsity of a 
property by attempting to find it on the image. 
To assess instructional equivalence, we compare detailed performance 
profiles of the neutral and imagery subjects. We can assume that imagery 
subjects use images as instructed, given that much previous work indicates that 
subjects adopt images when asked to do so (for reviews, see Finke, 1989, and 
Kosslyn, 1980). As discussed shortly, we also have independent verification 
from perceptual work that imagery subjects use images. Thus, the key issue is 
how neutral subjects compare to imagery subjects: If neutral subjects use 
images during perceptual simulation, then their detailed performance profiles 
should be essentially the same as those for imagery subjects. If both groups 
perform the task similarly, it is likely that neutral subjects use images, assuming 
that imagery subjects use them. On the other hand, if neutral subjects use 
amodal representations such as feature lists, frames, or semantic nets, then the 
detailed performance profiles of the two groups should differ considerably.1 
Turning to perceptual work, we manipulate a variable in each experiment 
that is known to affect perceptual processing, such as the visibility, size, or 
position of features. In both perception and imagery, it is well known that these 
variables affect performance (Finke, 1989; Kosslyn, 1980; Shepard & Cooper, 
1982). If neutral subjects in our conceptual tasks perform perceptual simulation, 
then we should see effects of these variables on their performance. The more 
perceptual work a subject has to do, the more difficult processing should be. In 
contrast, the amodal view predicts no such effects because perceptual 
simulation is irrelevant. 
Perceptual work provides an independent check on whether imagery subjects 
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use images as instructed. If they do, then perceptual work variables should 
affect their performance. To the extent that perceptual work variables affect 
neutral and imagery subjects similarly, instructional equivalence is established 
further. 
 
 
2.2. Feature listing  
 
In her dissertation, Ling-Ling Wu explored instructional equivalence and 
perceptual work in the feature listing task (Wu, 1995). In these experiments, 
subjects received nouns or noun phrases and were asked to produce features for 
them verbally. Wu performed detailed analyses of subjects' tape-recorded 
protocols to assess the hypotheses of interest. Whereas all previous accounts of 
feature listing assume that subjects produce features from feature lists, frames, 
or semantic networks, Wu predicted that subjects would simulate referents of 
these concepts perceptually and scan across them to identify features. 
2.2.1. Method and predictions. To assess instructional equivalence and 
perceptual work, Wu manipulated two orthogonal variables between subjects. 
For instructional equivalence, Wu manipulated production mode by giving 
subjects imagery, neutral, or word association instructions. As described earlier, 
the imagery subjects were asked to "construct an image for the concept and 
describe it", whereas the neutral subjects were simply asked to "list the 
characteristics typically true of a concept." The word association subjects were 
asked to "produce associated words that come to mind for a concept." 
According to the perceptual view, neutral and imagery subjects should 
produce the same detailed distributions of features (instructional equivalence), 
because both groups use perceptual simulation to generate features. 
Furthermore, neutral and imagery subjects should differ from word association 
subjects, who search lexical networks to produce features instead. In contrast, 
the amodal view predicts that neutral and imagery subjects should differ, 
because neutral subjects access features from feature lists, frames, and/or 
semantic nets, whereas imagery subjects access features via perceptual 
simulation. Furthermore, neutral subjects should perform similarly to word 
association subjects, because the amodal structures that neutral subjects access 
are often presumed similar to the linguistic structures that word association 
subjects access. 
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For perceptual work, Wu manipulated concept complexity. Half of the eight 
subjects in each production group received ten critical nouns, and the other half 
received the same nouns with revealing modifiers. For both groups, the nouns 
specified concepts such as watermelon, face, and lawn. In the noun phrase 
group, revealing modifiers were added to form complex concepts such as half 
watermelon, smiling face, and rolled-up lawn. When unmodified, these nouns 
refer to entities whose internal features are occluded by external surfaces (e.g., 
a green rind occludes red and seeds for watermelon). In contrast, when these 
nouns are coupled with revealing modifiers, the referents are entities whose 
internal parts are revealed (e.g., red and seeds for half watermelon). 
According to the perceptual view, neutral and imagery subjects should 
produce more internal features for the noun phrases than for the nouns, because 
perceptual simulations for the noun phrases reveal the insides of entities. 
Conversely, neutral and imagery subjects should produce few internal features 
for the nouns, because these perceptual simulations occlude internal features. 
The amodal view, as typically construed, makes no such prediction. Because 
amodal accounts of conceptual combination typically assume compositionality, 
a modifier should only affect the attribute it modifies and no other part of the 
concept. For half watermelon, half should only affect amount and have no 
bearing on internal features. Thus, compositional versions of the amodal view 
predict no effect of concept complexity. Non-compositional versions can be 
developed, but they are post hoc and essentially approximate the perceptual 
view, as we shall see later. 
2.2.2. Coding analysis. To analyze the protocol that a subject produced for a 
concept, Wu first parsed it into elemental features. She then coded each feature 
into one of 34 types and each cluster of related features into one of 9 types. 
High levels of coding reliability were established for parsing, features, and 
clusters (always above .8 and usually above .9). 
The 34 coding categories for individual features were organized 
hierarchically into 4 general types: entity, situation, introspection, and 
taxonomy. Within each general type, more specific types were defined, which 
we illustrate with examples for watermelon. Entity features included external 
components (rind), external perceived properties (green), internal components 
(seeds), internal perceived properties (sweet), and six additional types. Situation 
features included locations (park), participants (family), activities (eating), and 
nine additional types. Introspective features included affects/emotions (like it), 
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cognitive operations (similar to cantaloupe), negations (not neat and tidy), and 
four additional types. Taxonomic features included ontological categories 
(object), superordinates (fruit), coordinates (cantaloupe), and three additional 
types. Although subjects were only instructed to produce entity features (e.g., 
"list characteristics typically true of watermelons"), they also produced 
extensive numbers of situation, introspective, and taxonomic features, 
indicating that they situated objects environmentally, introspectively, and 
taxonomically. 
The nine coding categories for feature clusters were assigned to two or more 
contiguous features that described a common entity, the external surface of an 
entity, the internal region of an entity, a specific situation, a generic situation, 
an introspection, a time period, or an attribute's values. These eight cluster 
types could embed within one another hierarchically. The ninth cluster type was 
for one or more features that could not be meaningfully related to surrounding 
features. 
2.2.3. Results. To assess instructional equivalence, Wu computed the 
average frequency of each feature type per protocol in each of the six between-
subjects conditions. She similarly computed the average frequency of each 
cluster type. In a given condition, the averages for the 34 feature types 
constitute a complex performance profile for the types of information that 
subjects produced. Similarly, the averages for the 9 cluster types constitute a 
complex performance profile for how subjects organized their protocols. These 
two sets of performance profiles were used to assess instructional equivalence. 
If neutral subjects construct and scan images to produce features, their 
performance profiles should correlate highly with those for imagery subjects. 
Table 1 presents the results from this analysis. For neutral and imagery 
subjects, the correlations across frequencies for the 34 feature types were very 
high. In contrast, the correlations between neutral and word association subjects 
Table 1. Correlations between neutral, imagery, and word association subjects 
across feature and cluster frequencies (corrected correlations in parentheses).   
 Neutral-Imagery Correlations Neutral-Word Correlations      
 Nouns Noun phrases Nouns Noun phrases   
Features .89 (.99) .96 (.99) .73 (.89) .29 (.39) 
Clusters .81 (.93) .94 (.99) .61 (.63) .15 (.18)  
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were much lower. The results for feature clusters were similar. Furthermore, 
when the correlations between imagery and neutral subjects were corrected for 
reliability, they all rose well above .90, with three being .99 (see Table 2). 
These results indicate that neutral and imagery subjects produced similar 
features and feature organizations. Thus, instructional equivalence occurred to a 
considerable extent, suggesting that neutral subjects constructed and scanned 
images to produce features. The fact that neutral and word association subjects 
produced substantially different protocols indicates, first, that the production 
manipulation has effects, and second, that neutral subjects did not use 
representations that were very language-like. 
Turning to perceptual work, if neutral and imagery subjects simulated 
concepts perceptually, they should have produced more internal features for the 
noun phrases than for the nouns, because internal features should be revealed 
for the noun phrases but occluded for the nouns. The results in Table 2 support 
this prediction strongly. Subjects produced significantly more internal features 
for noun phrases than for nouns, not only in the imagery condition, but also in 
the neutral condition. Subjects also produced significantly more internal 
clusters for noun phrases than for nouns in both conditions. Consistent with the 
perceptual view, the increased frequency of internal features and internal 
clusters for noun phrases demonstrates an increased salience of internal 
information. 
Also consistent with the perceptual view, internal features occurred earlier in 
the protocols for noun phrases than for nouns. Using a normalized position 
measure, where 0 indicates the first feature in a protocol and 1 indicates the 
last, subjects produced internal features earlier for noun phrases than for nouns 
in both the neutral condition and the imagery condition (see Table 2). Subjects 
also produced internal clusters earlier for noun phrases than for nouns in both 
conditions. The earlier positions of internal features and internal clusters in 
Table 2. Average frequency of internal features and internal clusters in nouns 
and noun phrases (NPs) (average positions in parentheses).   
 Neutral Imagery Words        
 Nouns NPs Nouns NPs Nouns NPs   
Features .90 (.54) 2.23 (.42) 1.15 (.68) 2.45 (.44) .30 (.65) .70 (.52) 
Clusters .28 (.53) .68 (.40) .23 (.70) .80 (.50) .03 (.50) .18 (.57)  
Barsalou, Solomon, and Wu 11 
noun phrases further demonstrates the increased salience of internal 
information. 
Two additional results further implicate perceptual simulation: First, most 
subjects reported having images to a substantial extent, even in the word 
association conditions. Second, subjects produced surface features earlier than 
external components. This is consistent with an implication of the perceptual 
view that the more external a feature is, the earlier it should be reported. 
Because surface features lie only on the surface (e.g., green for watermelon), 
whereas surface components extend below it (e.g., rind), subjects should report 
surface features earlier, and they do for both nouns and noun phrases. 
2.2.4. Further experiments. In her dissertation, Wu performed two additional 
experiments that replicate and extend these results. In Experiment 2, she 
observed instructional equivalence and perceptual work, not only for familiar 
noun phrases (e.g., half watermelon, open computer, dug-up lawn), but also for 
novel noun phrases (e.g., gashed watermelon, transparent computer, rolled-up 
lawn). In Experiment 3, she observed instructional equivalence and perceptual 
work for both externally-focused noun phrases (e.g., striped watermelon, shiny 
car, scratched dresser) and internally-focused noun phrases (e.g., seedless 
watermelon, comfortable car, disorganized dresser). For the externally-focused 
modifiers, external features became more salient than internal features; for the 
internally-focused modifiers, internal features became more salient. These 
results confirm a priori predictions of the perceptual view that features salient 
in a perceptual simulation should be reported earlier and more often. 
In a final experiment, to be included in a published report of this work, we 
found that revealing modifiers are noun dependent. In the revealing condition, 
neutral subjects produced features for concepts such as rolled-up lawn, 
comfortable car, and open computer, with the prediction again being that 
internal features should be salient, because they are revealed in referents. In 
contrast, neutral subjects in the non-revealing condition produced features for 
concepts such as rolled-up snake, comfortable watch, and open hands, with the 
prediction being that internal features should not be salient, because they are 
not revealed in simulations of these referents. The results supported this 
prediction, indicating that amodal rules for modifiers can't account for the 
results of the previous experiments (e.g., "if rolled-up modifies a noun, increase 
the salience of internal features in the noun's concept"). Instead, an amodal 
view requires a different post hoc rule for every noun concept, which rests on a 
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perceptual examination of its referents. A more parsimonious and principled 
account is that subjects simulate referents perceptually, with features being 
more salient when revealed than occluded. 
 
 
2.3. Property verification  
 
Perhaps the perceptual processing in Wu's experiments reflects the fact that 
feature listing is a slow, sequential, and recall-oriented task. Because subjects 
have no time constraints, they can generate detailed images and use them to 
produce features. If so, then we might not see perceptual processing in a faster, 
recognition-oriented task. If perceptual simulation underlies conceptual 
processing in general, however, we should observe it in conceptual tasks of 
both types. To explore this issue, Karen Olseth Solomon has been assessing 
instructional equivalence and perceptual work in the property verification task 
(for a preliminary report of this work, see Olseth & Barsalou, 1995). 
In the property verification task, subjects receive the name of a concept 
followed by the name of a property and have to verify whether the property is 
true of the concept. For example, subjects might verify that mane is a property 
of horse, or they might verify that faucet is not. Subjects make few errors 
(under 10%) and generally produce reaction times under 1 sec. 
Theoretical accounts assume that subjects verify properties by retrieving 
concept-property relations from feature lists, frames, semantic nets, and so 
forth. The only dissenting voice to the amodal view has been Kosslyn (1976, 
1980). When Kosslyn asked some subjects to find the properties on images of 
the concepts, he found that property size predicted verification time: The larger 
the property, the faster the verification. Based on this result, Kosslyn concluded 
that subjects can use perceptual representations in this conceptual task, with 
larger properties being easier to find on images. However, Kosslyn also ran a 
group of neutral subjects, whose performance was not influenced by property 
size. Because associative strength influenced their performance instead, 
Kosslyn concluded that neutral subjects use amodal semantic nets, with highly 
associated properties being accessed faster from a concept's node than weakly 
associated properties. Because these properties are represented amodally, size 
has no effect on verification time. 
A potential problem with this study is that neutral subjects may not have 
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performed conceptual processing, thereby precluding any conclusions about the 
nature of conceptual representations. To see why this could be a problem, 
consider the false trials of the experiment. On these trials, the properties 
appeared quite easy to reject, because they were not associated with their 
respective concepts (e.g., MOUSE-stinger). In contrast, the true properties 
tended to be associated with their concepts (e.g., CAT-claw). Thus, subjects 
could have adopted the following strategy: If the words for the concept and 
property are associated, respond true; if they're unassociated, respond false. 
Subjects could have simply used linguistic associations between words to 
perform the task, rather than accessing conceptual knowledge about objects and 
their properties. If subjects adopted this associativeness strategy, it precludes a 
test of whether conceptual knowledge is amodal or perceptual. 
To remedy this problem, Solomon performed an experiment in which she 
manipulated the associativeness of the false properties. Similar to Kosslyn's 
experiments, the false properties were unassociated with their concepts for half 
of the subjects (e.g., CRAB-brick, BEAVER-rope, MONKEY-string). 
However, the false properties for the remaining subjects were highly associated 
with their concepts (e.g., CRAB-fin, BEAVER-quills, MONKEY-banana). 
When false properties are unassociated, Solomon predicted lack of 
instructional equivalence, similar to Kosslyn. Because neutral subjects can use 
the associativeness strategy, they should not access conceptual knowledge and 
should therefore not exhibit perceptual work. In contrast, imagery subjects 
should exhibit perceptual work, because they follow instructions and use 
perceptual representations. When false properties are associated, however, 
Solomon predicted both instructional equivalence and perceptual work. 
Because these false properties block the associativeness strategy, neutral 
subjects must access conceptual knowledge. If this knowledge is perceptual, 
then these subjects, like imagery subjects, should exhibit perceptual work. 
2.3.1. Method. To assess these predictions, Solomon manipulated two 
variables orthogonally between subjects: instructions and associativeness. 
Analogous to Kosslyn's studies, half of the subjects received imagery 
instructions, and half received neutral instructions. As just described, half of the 
subjects in each instructional condition received unassociated false properties, 
and half received associated false properties. Independent scaling verified the 
associativeness manipulation. 
Following 76 practice trials, 44 subjects performed 224 critical trials, half 
Barsalou, Solomon, and Wu 14 
true and half false in a random order. Concepts ranged widely across natural 
kinds and artifacts. Each property was only seen once, although concepts were 
presented on multiple trials (on the average, about twice on true trials and twice 
on false trials). To begin each trial, subjects pressed a foot pedal and received 
the word for a concept for 500 msec. After a blank screen for 1200 msec, the 
word for a property appeared simultaneously with the initiation of the reaction 
time measurement in milliseconds, which terminated with a true or false key 
press. Subjects were instructed to respond true only if the property was a 
physical part of the concept's referents.  Feedback was not provided about 
correctness of the response. Errors were less than 10%, there was no speed-
accuracy trade-off, and unusually long reaction times were removed from the 
analysis. 
2.3.2. Scaling and regression. To test the hypotheses, it was necessary to 
scale the true concept-property pairs on a wide variety of measures that fell into 
four groups: associative, perceptual, property expectancy, and property 
goodness. The associative measures included concept-to-property strength, 
property-to-concept strength, and two others. The perceptual measures included 
the absolute area of properties in the image field, the absolute length of 
properties, the position of properties relative to the top of the image, the 
position of properties relative to the left of the image, the salience of properties 
in the image, and seven others. The property expectancy measures included 
how many objects have a similar property, how similar the property is across 
different objects, and one other. The property goodness measures included 
whether the properties were components, regions, or materials, and whether the 
word for the property is more likely to be interpreted as an object than as a 
property (e.g., barrel for rifle). The data for all measures were collected from 
independent groups of subjects, none who participated in the main experiment. 
Solomon scaled every measure that struck us as having any potential for 
capturing variance in the verification task. Besides the twenty measures in the 
final analyses, Solomon scaled another twenty or so that turned out to be 
redundant with other measures. Once the scaling process was completed, 
Solomon had a value on each scaled measure for each true concept-property 
pair. Because the associative and perceptual measures were of primary 
theoretical interest, and because they accounted for most of the variance, we 
focus on them here, excluding the property expectancy and property goodness 
measures. 
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To test the key hypotheses, Solomon regressed the mean reaction times for 
the true concept-property pairs onto the associative and perceptual measures, 
once for each of the four instruction by associativeness conditions. Of interest 
was which measures best predicted verification times in each condition. Most 
importantly for the perceptual view, perceptual factors should predict 
performance in the neutral-associated condition. Because the associated false 
properties block the associativeness strategy, neutral subjects should perform 
perceptual simulation to verify properties, such that perceptual factors predict 
verification times. In contrast, when the false properties are unassociated, 
neutral subjects can adopt the associativeness strategy, such that associative 
factors dominate prediction. 
To ensure broad conclusions, Solomon performed these regressions in many 
manners, with the qualitative pattern of results remaining constant across them. 
The regressions reported here are hierarchical, with the associative measures 
always entered into the regressions before the perceptual measures. Thus, the 
perceptual measures only account for additional variance that the associative 
measures did not capture first. This provides a conservative test of whether 
perceptual factors play a central role in property verification. 
2.3.3. Results and discussion. Table 3 presents the results from this analysis. 
When the false properties were unassociated with their concepts, associative 
measures explained the most variance for neutral subjects, and perceptual 
measures did not account for significant variance. As predicted, these subjects 
adopted the associativeness strategy, because the associative strength between 
concepts and properties provided useful information for producing correct 
responses. 
In contrast, when the false properties were associated with their concepts, 
associative measures accounted for no significant variance in the neutral 
condition. Because both true and false properties were associated with their 
concepts, subjects could not use associativeness as a cue but had to use 
conceptual knowledge. Most importantly, this conceptual knowledge appears to 
be perceptual, because perceptual measures now account for the most variance. 
Even though the perceptual measures entered the regression after the 
associative measures, they accounted, not only for significant unique variance, 
but for the most. Thus, when neutral subjects are forced to perform conceptual 
processing, they shift from an associative strategy to perceptual simulation. 
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The two imagery conditions further support these conclusions. In the 
imagery-unassociated condition, both associative and perceptual measures 
accounted for significant variance. Because these subjects followed instructions 
and used images, perceptual measures predicted their performance. Because the 
unassociated false properties allowed the associativeness strategy, associative 
strength predicted performance as well. In contrast, associative strength did not 
account for significant variance in the imagery-associated condition, indicating 
that the associated false properties again blocked the associativeness strategy. 
Instead, only the perceptual measures accounted for significant variance. 
In summary, this experiment found evidence of both instructional 
equivalence and perceptual work. When associated false trials blocked the 
associativeness strategy, instructional equivalence held between neutral and 
imagery subjects. Furthermore, the dominant roles of perceptual measures in 
both conditions implicate perceptual work. Thus, instructional equivalence and 
perceptual work don't just occur for feature listing—they also occur for 
property verification. Perceptual simulation is central in conceptual tasks that 
are fast and recognition-oriented, as well as in ones that are slow and recall-
oriented. 
One other result deserves mention. As described earlier, Kosslyn (1976, 
1980) found that imagery subjects verified large properties faster than small 
ones, suggesting that it's easier to find large properties on images. In contrast, 
we found that small properties were verified faster than large properties in 
every condition, holding all other factors constant. We interpret this result as 
indicating that it takes longer to construct a large property on an image than a 
small one, consistent with Kosslyn, Reiser, Farah, and Fliegel (1983). 
2.3.4. Further experiments. As Figure 3 illustrates, the total variance 
accounted for is not high. This primarily reflects the low reliability of the 
Table 3. Percentage of variance accounted for in a hierarchical regression, with 
associative factors entered first.   
 Unassociated false trials Associated false trials      
Factors Neutral Imagery Neutral Imagery   
Associative 16* 16* 6 6 
Perceptual 10 15* 18* 29*   
* Significant at p < .05 in accounting for unique variance.  
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average reaction times for the concept-property pairs. A later experiment in 
Solomon's dissertation attempts to replicate these results, using more subjects to 
increase reliability and explained variance. This experiment also uses materials 
that do not repeat concepts, and it uses new scaling methods that appear 
superior to the original ones. 
 
 
2.4. Part similarity  
 
The finding that subjects simulate a part of an object in order to verify it 
leads to a further prediction: If the same part is constructed on images of two 
different objects, the ease of constructing the part on the second object should 
depend on the nature of the part constructed on the first object. To see this 
prediction, imagine that a subject verifies mane for pony at one point in an 
experiment. Imagine on a later trial that the subject verifies mane for horse and 
that the earlier image of a pony's mane becomes active. Because the image of 
the pony's mane is much like the mane that needs to be constructed on the 
image of a horse, the mane for pony facilitates this process. In contrast, imagine 
that a different subject first verifies mane for lion and later verifies mane for 
horse. The mane of a lion is qualitatively different from the manes of ponies 
and horses. Whereas a lion's mane traverses the circumference of its neck, the 
mane of a pony or horse traverses the length of its neck. Thus, verifying mane 
for lion could have a detrimental effect on later verifying mane for horse. 
To test this hypothesis, Solomon and Barsalou (1996) had subjects verify 
target pairs (e.g., HORSE-mane) either after verifying similar parts earlier in the 
experiment (e.g., PONY-mane) or after verifying dissimilar parts (e.g., LION-
mane). The perceptual view predicts that the similarity of a part's two 
instantiations will affect performance on the second verification. In contrast, 
standard amodal views do not make this prediction a priori. Because they 
represent mane using the same part concept in all object concepts, they predict 
no difference. Amodal views could be developed to account for this result, but 
they do so post hoc and require perceptual representations to make the 
prediction. 
A potential confounding is that concepts in the similar-parts condition are 
more similar taxonomically than in the different-parts condition. For example, 
pony and horse are more similar than lion and horse. Thus, faster processing for 
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HORSE-mane after PONY-mane than after LION-mane could reflect the 
taxonomic similarity of the concepts, not the perceptual similarity of the parts. 
To control this confounding, a second property was found that was 
approximately the same across all three concepts. For example, back is 
approximately the same for horse, pony, and lion. If taxonomic similarity is 
important, subjects should verify HORSE-back faster after verifying PONY-
back than after verifying LION-back. Conversely, if part similarity is important, 
there should be no difference, because back is equally similar for all three 
concepts. Independent scaling verified this manipulation. 
2.4.1. Method. Two orthogonal factors were manipulated within subjects: 
Concept similarity and part similarity. Concept similarity concerned the 
similarity of the two concepts in a sequence, either high (e.g., PONY followed 
by HORSE) or low (e.g., LION followed by HORSE). Part similarity concerned 
whether a property was similar across all three concepts (e.g., back for HORSE, 
PONY, and LION), or similar for only two of them (e.g., mane for HORSE and 
PONY but not LION). There were 16 total sets of such materials. Each of the 48 
subjects received only one sequence of pairs from each set, but received four 
sequences of each type across sets in a carefully controlled and counterbalanced 
manner. The number of trials intervening between the two pairs of a sequence 
ranged from 10 to 25 with an average of 17.5. Filler trials obscured the 
structure of the critical materials. The procedure for timing the trial sequence 
was the same as in the previous experiment (2.3.1), except that subjects 
received feedback. 
2.4.2. Results and discussion. The results in Table 4 confirm the predictions 
of the perceptual view. For parts that differed across the three concepts (e.g., 
mane), subjects were significantly faster to verify the second pair if the earlier 
instantiation of the part was similar than if it was dissimilar. This effect did not 
reflect the taxonomic similarity of the concepts. For parts that were the same 
across all three concepts (e.g., back), subjects were no faster to verify 
sequences of similar concepts (e.g., PONY followed by HORSE) than sequences 
of dissimilar concepts (e.g., LION followed by HORSE). 
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Thus, the critical factor was the perceptual similarity of the parts. Processing 
a part's second instantiation was faster when its first instantiation was similar 
than when it was dissimilar. When part similarity was held constant, taxonomic 
similarity had no effect, indicating that only part similarity was important. 
These results confirm a strong a priori prediction of the perceptual view that the 
perceptual detail of parts can enter into conceptual processing. 
2.4.3. Further experiments. Because the first experiment had an interval of 
1700 msec between the onsets of the concepts and the properties, various 
strategic processes could have entered into subjects' performance. To eliminate 
this possibility, a second experiment shortened the onset asynchrony between 
the concept and property to 250 msec. As has been well established in the 
literature, this short interval precludes any strategic processing that could bias 
performance (e.g., Neely, 1977). This change in the procedure had no effect, 
with the same pattern emerging as in the first experiment. In two other 
experiments, we are implementing a variety of base line conditions to establish 
whether the critical effects reflect facilitation and/or interference. 
3. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have tried to make two fundamental points: First, it is 
possible to develop a powerful and sophisticated theory of perceptual symbols 
that supports the standard symbolic functions. Second, strong empirical 
evidence exists that perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing. 
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Table 4. Average reaction time in milliseconds for the second concept-property 
pair of a sequence (error rates in parentheses).   
Condition Example of a sequence RT (errors)   
Similar parts PONY-mane HORSE-mane 725 (2%) 
Dissimilar parts LION-mane HORSE-mane 778 (5%) 
Similar categories PONY-back HORSE-back 691 (4%) 
Dissimilar categories LION-back HORSE-back 695 (2%)  
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1 The reader might worry that we predict the null hypothesis, namely, that the neutral and 
imagery groups should not differ. However, we always include either a third group of 
subjects, whom we predict to differ from neutral and imagery subjects, or a variable on 
which imagery and neutral subjects should differ on one level. Thus, we always predict 
complex patterns of results that include positive effects. Furthermore, the perceptual and 
amodal views make complex patterns of predictions across the manipulations of 
instructional equivalence and perceptual work together. The perceptual view predicts a null 
effect for instructional equivalence but a positive effect for perceptual work, whereas the 
amodal view predicts a positive effect for instructional equivalence but a null effect for 
perceptual work. Again, each view makes complex patterns of prediction that go 
considerably beyond local predictions of null effects. 
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